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Abstract. This study examines whether CEO origin and tenure affect 
earnings quality. Using firms listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
between 2012 and 2014, we provide evidence that firms with insider CEOs 
report earnings of higher quality relative to those with outsider CEOs. We 
further show that as CEO tenure increases and CEOs obtain more 
experience, the effect of CEO origin on earnings quality becomes less 
significant.  
1 Introduction 
This study examines the effects of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) origin and tenure on 
earnings quality. CEO origin is associated with whether from the CEO was hired from 
inside or outside the company. An insider CEO is one that has been working for the 
company prior to the appointment to the CEO position. An outsider CEO, on the contrary, 
is hired from outside the company. CEO origin is one of the demographic characteristics 
that potentially affect the crucial decision-making by CEOs, such as accounting decisions 
[1]. The upper echelons theory states that managers’ demographic characteristics are 
associated with their cognitive styles and values that affect the manager managerial 
decision-making [2]. Further, Shen and Cannella found that outsider CEOs has a stronger 
association with corporate performance than insider CEO [3]. The study also finds that 
outsider CEOs tend to have a shorter tenure than insider CEO [3, 4, 5]. 
Outsiders CEOs face stronger pressure to demonstrate their capabilities, and thus have 
more incentives to manage earnings, especially in their early years. Kuang et al. find that 
outsider CEOs have stronger incentives to manage earnings at the beginning of the tenure 
years following the appointment as CEO, when compared to insider CEO [5]. This study 
extends Kuang et al. to test whether CEO origin affects earnings quality by incorporating 
CEO tenure as a moderating variable [4].  
This study uses discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings quality by using accrual 
estimation error from the Dechow and Dichev model. We also use the modified Jones 
model to measure accruals quality as an additional analysis. 
We find that in general, insider CEOs report earnings of higher quality than outsider 
CEOs. Further tests indicate that the result is prevalent only when CEO tenure is less than 
the median value (less than five years). When CEO tenure reaches five year or longer, the 
superior earnings quality associated with insiders CEOs is no longer present. This is 
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consistent with the view that since outsider CEOs face greater pressure to show results, they 
tend to manage earnings early in their tenure years, lowering earnings quality. This results 
in a lower earnings quality for firms with outsider CEOs relative to those with insider 
CEOs. However, when they survived the early years, they no longer have as great 
incentives to manage earnings. Consequently, after five years, there is no longer any 
significant difference in earnings quality between firms with insider and those with outsider 
CEOs.  
This study has several important contributions. This study contributes to the 
accounting literature by providing evidence on the effect CEO origin on earnings quality 
and how CEO tenure moderates the association between the two variables. This study 
provides insight to investors and board of directors that hiring CEOs from within provides 
an advantage in the form of higher earnings quality, at least in the early years, relative to 
hiring outsiders. 
2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
2.1 CEO Origins 
High earnings quality reflects the company's operational performance more accurately [6]. 
Dechow et al. argues that higher quality earnings provide more information about the 
features of a firm’s financial performance that are relevant to a specific decision made by a 
specific decision maker [7]. Previous studies have examined the determinants of earnings 
quality with a focus on the characteristics or background of top managers. The results of 
these studies provide mixed results [8].  
One aspect stakeholders need to consider when appointing a new CEO is CEO origin. 
Shen and Cannella argue that outsider CEOs are usually hired when companies desire that 
their leadership take a new direction [3]. Further, CEOs are hired from outside when the 
company has a poor performance. This situation requires an outsider CEO to be hired to 
immediately address the problems and take actions quickly. Consequently, outsider CEOs 
from are likely to face greater pressure from board of directors and the market to show his 
managerial ability to achieve results immediately. 
Davidson et al. define that a CEO is an insider when the CEO has worked for the 
company for more than six years. CEOs working for the company for less than six years are 
classified as outsiders [9]. Kuang et al. [5] describe that CEOs recruited from outside the 
companies often take advantage of his opportunity as CEO to demonstrate their capability 
to improve corporate performance [5]. This is useful for his career, so that the labor market 
can assess and evaluate the CEO's capabilities by comparing it with the CEO recruited from 
inside the company. Wieserma and Shen and Cannella argued that CEOs from outside the 
company have stronger interests to report better performance in the long term however, the 
outsider CEOs tend to have expectations for survival in the company lower than the insider 
CEOs [4, 3].  
There are several advantages to recruit outsider CEO; (1) CEO from outside company 
more demonstrated his/her ability to improve his/her career [5, 10], and (2) CEO from 
outside company has the advantage that a company's reputation is maintained especially 
when companies facing financial distressed or poor performance [11]. Appointment of 
insider CEO has two advantages, are: (1) inside CEO is to have a better understanding 
about the internal condition of the company, product, market and competition, and a closer 
relationship with the client, and (2) inside CEO is to have better social networks, so that 
they can obtain specific information [12].  
Kuang et al. [5] found that CEOs recruited from outside the company have stronger 
incentives to manage earnings at the beginning of the tenure years when compared to 
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insider CEOs [5]. This implies that outsider CEOs manage earnings more than insider 
CEOs. Outsider CEOs feel more pressure to to demonstrate good performance early in their 
tenur years. Therefore, it is expected that outside CEOs will manage earnings more 
intensively than insider CEOs, especially in the beginning of their tenure years.  
 
2.2 CEO Tenure 
Existing empirical evidence find that the market cannot accurately judge the ability of a 
CEO at the beginning his tenure [12], especially when the CEO does not have previous 
experience as a CEO. Newly hired CEOs are aware that the market evaluates their ability 
based on the past and current performance [13]. Thus, to build a reputation in the market 
and to avoid being  labeleld as "low skill" managers, CEOs in early tenure years are likely 
to have a strong incentive to report good performance. Thus, if the actual performance of 
certain periods is lower than expected, CEOs have strong incentives to puff up the 
company's income through aggressive reporting. 
Zhang concludes that CEOs with longer tenure are less likely to be aggressive in 
financial reporting compared CEOs with shorter tenure [13]. CEOs who have  longer tenure 
will try to maintain their reputation, so the CEOs are less aggressive. Further, Ali and 
Zhang found that CEOs at the beginning of their tenure overstate reported accounting 
earnings instead of at the end of tenure [14]. The new executives need to prove to the 
stakeholders of their performance at the beginning of their tenure to quickly obtain 
recognition and job security.  
Kim and Yang provides empirical evidence that a board of directors with longer 
tenure has a positive impact on financial reporting quality [15]. Specifically, these findings 
concluded that the boards of directors with longer tenure are associated with lower 
discretionary accruals. On the contrary, Santoso provides different evidence that CEOs who 
have a longer tenure actually reported higher discretionary accruals than CEOs with a 
shorter tenure [16].  
 
2.3 Hypotheses Statements 
Based on the arguments in the previous sections, we propose the following the hypothesis: 
H1: Insider CEOs report earnings of higher quality than outsider CEOs.  
H2: As CEO tenure increases, the effect of CEO origin on earnings quality become less 
significant.  
 
 
3 Research Methodology 
3.1 Population and Sampling 
The study uses firms listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2012 to 2014 as 
the sample. Following other studies, firms in the financial sector are excluded from the 
sample. Table 1 Panel A describes the sample selection procedure. The initial sample size is 
1,448 firm-years. After eliminating financial firms, public firms younger than two years 
old, those with missing financial data or with insufficient information about CEO details, 
and outliers, we obtain a total sample of 632 firm-years for the study. Table 1 Panel B 
shows that the majority of the CEOs are insiders (88.9%), while the longest tenure is 48 
years and the shortest tenure is 1 year. Further, the table shows that the average age of CEO 
is 52.87 years old, with the oldest is 85 years old and the youngest is 29 years old.  
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3.2 Research Model and Variable Measurement 
We follow Dechow and Dichev (2002) to calculate the discretionary accruals  [17]. The 
following equation (1) presents the research model, with absolute value of accrual 
estimation error or ABS_DD obtained from Dechow and Dichev (2002) as the dependent 
variable. A higher value of ABS_DD indicates lower earnings quality, and vice versa [18, 
13]. 
_ = ∝	+∝
  + ∝  +∝  +∝  +   
                                  ∝  +∝! " +∝#  + ∝$  +∝% &'()* + 
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	 ,- + .                                                                   (1)                    
To estimate ABS_DD, we calculate total accruals (TAit) with the following equation 
(2) below.  
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 TAit is the total accruals calculated as net income minus operating cash flow; :
 
is the total assets of the firm  from year ) − 1, :
 is the operating cash flow in the 
Panel A: Sample Selection
2012 2013 2014 Total
Total public firms listed in IDX 459 483 506 1448
Less:
   Financial sectors (75) (81) (87) (243)
   Delisting public firms in IDX (4) (7) (1) (12)
   Public firms listed less 2 years (23) (31) (24) (78)
   Missing financial data or CEO demographic data (207) (109) (115) (424)
   Outlier (18) (15) (19) (38)
Final sample 132 240 260 632
Table 1
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
Procedure
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics (n = 632)
Min Max Mean Median SD
ABS_DD 6.21E-05 0.551 0.053 0.038 0.059
ORIGIN 0 1 0.889 1 0.314
TENURE 1 48 8.677 5 9.515
AGE 29 85 52.866 52 8.448
FirmSize 5.674 19.122 13.857 13.997 1.924
LNSDOCF 4.071 15.909 10.737 10.848 1.980
ROA -0.297 0.613 0.062 0.049 0.096
LEV 0.007 0.986 0.459 0.461 0.210
LOSS 0 1 0.141 0 0.348
YEAR 0 1 0.791 1 0.407
INDUSTRY 0 1 0.704 1 0.457
Variable
Variable definition: 
ABS_DD : discretionary accruals as earnings quality proxy using Dechow and  Dichev model, 
ORIGIN : CEO origin determined by a dummy variable equal to 1, if insider CEO; 0 if otherwise, 
AGE : CEO age determined by a dummy variable to 1, if age more than the median years; 0 if 
otherwise, 
TENURE : CEO tenure determined by a dummy variable to 1, if tenure more than  median year; 0 if 
otherwise, 
FIRMSIZE : natural logarithm of sales, 
LNSDOCF : operating cash flow volatility estimated by standard deviation of operating   cash flow in 
year t-1, t, and t+1 divided by total asset in year t-1, 
ROA : return on assets measured by net income divided by total assets in year t, 
LEV : leverage measured by total liabilities divided by total assets in year t, 
LOSS :  financial condition measured by a dummy variable equal to 1, if net income is negative; 0 
if otherwise, 
YEAR : years observation as measured by a dummy variable equal to 1, if observation in 2014; 0 if
otherwise, 
INDUSTRY : industrial sector, as measured by a dummy variable equal to 1, if industry sector is 
excluded from trade, services, and investment sectors, services, and investment sectors; 0 
if otherwise. 
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year ) − 1; is the operating cash flows of year ); <
 is the operating cash flow in 
the year ) + 1; and  . is error term. CEO origin is a dummy variable set to 1 if the CEO is 
an insider and 0 otherwise. Insider CEO is defined as in Davidson et al. [12]. We also 
define CEO tenure as a dummy variable set to 1 if CEO tenure is less than the median 
tenure of CEO (shorter tenure), and if 0 otherwise. Following previous studies (e.g. Wang 
2006), this study includes some control variables such as CEO’s age, firm’s size, the 
volatility of cash flow operating (LNSDOCF), ROA, leverage (LEV) and negative earnings 
(LOSS) [19]. _ 
4 Result  
Table 2 shows that the variable ORIGIN for the regression with the full sample has a 
negative impact on the size of absolute discretionary accruals. The result implies that the 
insider CEOs report a lower discretionary accruals than the outsider CEO. In other words, 
insider CEOs report higher earnings quality than outsider CEOs. The result supports H1.  
 
 
To test hypothesis 2, we split the sample into two groups based on the CEO tenure. 
The first group consists of observations whose CEO tenure is shorter than five years 
(N=348), while the second group consists of those with five years or longer (N=284). The 
result suggests that insider CEOs are associated with higher earnings quality relative to 
outsider CEOs only in the early years of their tenure. Table 2 shows that for CEOs whose 
tenure is less than five year, insider CEOs generate higher earnings quality. However, for 
CEOs whose tenure is five years or longer, we do not find any association between CEO 
origin and earnings quallity. This could be interpreted as that earnings quality gap between 
insider and outsider CEOs are more prevalent in the first years. As outsider CEOs have 
more experience after holding their position for five years or longer, the earnings quality 
gap between insider CEOs and outsider CEOs become less significant. The result supports 
H2.   
We also conduct additional analysis using accrual quality measure from the model 
developed by Dechow et al [20]. Generally, the results of the additional analysis (not 
tabulated) are consistent with the results reported in this study.   
Independent Short-term (< 5 years) Long-term (≥ 5 years)
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
ORIGIN -0.021 ** -2.414 0.024 1.421 -0.016 ** -2.205
TENURE -0.008 * -1.757
Control Variables
AGE 0.006 0.803 -0.007 -1.361 -0.001 -0.156
FIRMSIZE -0.009 *** -3.728 -0.004 ** -2.022 -0.006 *** -4.204
LNSDOCF 0.002 1.050 0.000 0.152 0.001 1.017
LEV 0.038 ** 2.319 0.016 1.132 0.029 *** 2.582
ROA 0.209 *** 5.774 0.162 *** 4.896 0.194 *** 7.621
LOSS 0.044 *** 4.664 0.023 ** 2.518 0.039 *** 5.790
YEAR 0.025 *** 2.862 0.009 1.509 0.017 *** 3.182
INDUSTRY -0.010 -1.366 -0.014 *** -2.567 -0.013 *** -2.772
n 348 284 632
Adj R2 16.91% 10.27% 15%
F-statistic 8.846 4.597 12.494
See Table 1  for the variable definitions.
Table 2
Regression Results for the Impact of CEO Origin on Earnings Quality
Dependent Variables (ABS_DD )
Full Sample
***, **,  and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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 5. Conclusion 
This study investigates the effect of CEO origin and CEO tenure on earnings quality. We 
find that compared with outsider CEOs, insider CEOs tend to report earnings with higher 
quality. However, we find that the effect of CEO origin is prevalent only in the early years 
of CEO tenure. After five years, we do not find any significant difference in earnings 
quality between firms with insider CEOs and those with outsider CEOs.  
This study contributes to the accounting literature by providing evidence on the 
effect CEO origin on earnings quality and how CEO tenure moderates the association 
between the two variables. This study provides insight to investors that hiring CEOs from 
within provides an advantage in the form of higher earnings quality, at least in the early 
years, relative to hiring outsiders.  
Further studies could investigate more deeply on the relationship of the origin of 
the CEO and the company’s financial reporting behavior in the context of horizon 
problems. Researcher might also consider factors such as CEO educational background in 
accounting, accounting certification, whether CEO turnover was routine or nonroutine, and 
their impacts on earnings quality. 
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